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new book is Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative
Decision Making. Another book, Smart Choices, co-authored with his
former doctoral students John Hammond and Ralph Keeney, was the
CPR (formerly known as the Center for Public Resources) Institute for
Dispute Resolution Book of the Year in 1998. Raiffa helped to create
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and he later
became its first Director, serving in that capacity from 1972 to 1975.
His many honors and awards include the Distinguished Contribution
Award from the Society of Risk Analysis; the Frank P. Ramsey Medal
for outstanding contributions to the field of decision analysis from the
Operations Research Society of America; and the Melamed Prize from
the University of Chicago Business School for The Art and Science of
Negotiation. He earned a Gold Medal from the International Associa-
tion for Conflict Management and a Lifetime Achievement Award from
the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. He holds honorary doctor’s
degrees from Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Michigan,
Northwestern University, Ben Gurion University of the Negev and Har-
vard University. The latter was awarded in 2002.
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This conversation took place as part of an in-
formal seminar in the Department of Statistics at
Carnegie Mellon University on April 3, 2000, pre-
ceding by a day a seminar at which Howard Raiffa
received the 1999 Dickson Prize in Science from the
University. Others present and participating in the
discussion included William Eddy, Rob Kass, Jay
Kadane and Raiffa’s wife of 55 years, Estelle. The
topic of Howard’s presentation at the Dickson cere-
mony was: “The Analytical Roots of a Decision Sci-
entist.” For the Department of Statistics he elabo-
rated on the years 1947–1967.
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Fig. 1. Howard Raiffa following the interview. April, 2000.
Fienberg: In 1964 I arrived as a graduate student
at Harvard and in my first class on statistical in-
ference, a faculty member, whose name I will not
mention, began teaching inference from a Neyman–
Pearson perspective, that is, hypothesis testing and
confidence intervals. In fact, we studied Erich
Lehmann’s book on hypothesis testing. It was clear
to me that this wasn’t the way I wanted to think
about statistics. I asked around the department about
what alternatives were available to me and some-
one said: “On Monday afternoons they have a semi-
nar at the business school across the Charles River.”
So I just showed up one Monday afternoon. It was
one of the most wonderful experiences of my gradu-
ate career. Although I have no memory of who was
speaking that first afternoon, I recall that it was the
most animated and heated discussion I had engaged
in at any point in my career up to that point. It
turned out that the seminar and the heated discus-
sion were replicated every Monday afternoon. One
of the leaders of that Monday afternoon seminar was
Howard Raiffa.
Raiffa: That was called the Decision Under Un-
certainty seminar, the DUU seminar, and it was one
of the exciting parts of my life as well. And it went
on for four years, from 1961 to 1964.
I ran that seminar with my colleague Robert Schlai-
fer. Between the weekly sessions of the seminar, a
few of us exchanged a flood of memos comment-
ing on what was discussed and what should have
been discussed. Although there was a demand for
air time, we never scheduled starting a new topic
until we felt that we had completed the train of re-
search thinking on the table. Half-baked ideas were
given priority.
Fienberg: I was lucky to be able to attend for a
couple of them! I brought along with me a couple
of slices of statistical history this afternoon: Applied
Statistical Decision Theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961)
and Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory (Pratt,
Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1995). They come from the
same period as the DUU seminar and both books
had a tremendous impact on the Bayesian revival of
the 1960s. I’m hoping we will have a chance to talk
about them in a few minutes, but let’s go back a lit-
tle further in time and start with how you became
a statistician.
Raiffa: Let me start at a decision node. I was
a First Lieutenant in the Air Force in charge of
a radar-blind-landing system at Tachikawa Airfield
near Tokyo—ground-controlled approach it was
called—and I was due for a routine discharge after
completing 44 months in the armed services. Should
I continue in Japan acting in the same extraordinar-
ily exciting capacity as a civilian, earning oodles of
money, or should I return to the States to complete
my bachelor’s degree, and if so, where, and to study
what? I was 22. I thought of becoming an engineer
building upon my practical experience with radar.
I learned from an army buddy of a field I had never
heard of: actuarial mathematics. Merit counted in
the actuarial profession since budding actuaries had
to pass nine competitive exams. The place to go to
prepare for the first three of them was University of
Michigan.
Fienberg: Howard, I thought you went to City
College.
Raiffa: Before going into the army, I was more
interested in athletics than scholarship. I was the
captain of my high school basketball team in New
York City—a high school of 14,000 students—at a
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time when basketball was the rage in NYC. I was a
mediocre B student in my freshman and sophomore
years at City College of New York (CCNY), the col-
lege of choice for poor and middle-income students
in New York—I was on the poor side. Four years
later, when I returned to college at the University
of Michigan, I became a superb student. That sur-
prised me. I also was a married man determined to
become employable after getting my bachelors de-
gree. For a while I thought the students at CCNY
were just brighter than those in Michigan, but on
reflection I didn’t like that explanation. Something
changed within me. I was shooting for straight A’s
and getting them.
Fienberg: We could statistically investigate this
change if we had the right sort of data. But Howard,
did you ever take those actuarial exams and how
come you stayed on and got your master’s degree in
statistics?
Raiffa: I got my bachelor’s in Actuarial Math and
passed the first three exams and was on my way to
becoming an actuary preparing for the fourth exam
when I decided that I really wanted to study some-
thing more cerebral—something more theoretical.
Fienberg: Why statistics?
Raiffa: The second actuarial exam was on proba-
bility theory and we actuarial students took a course
that delighted me. It used Whitworth’s Choice and
Chance, full of intriguing puzzlers on combinations
and permutations. Brain teasers galore. The book
was short on theory and long on problems and I loved
it, and I was good at it. I just couldn’t put it down.
I was good enough that my professors encouraged
me to go on and get a master’s degree. So I took a
master’s degree in statistics. Frankly, I was also dis-
appointed in that as well because, at that time, the
statistics program in the mathematics department
was short on theory and depth and long on compu-
tational manipulations. I remember having to invert
an 8 × 8 matrix. People are laughing because now
you enter an 8 × 8 matrix in your computer and
poof, out comes the answer. But in those days we
had a mechanical Marchant calculator and I hated
it. Even though I won a prize for speed, it did me
in.
Fienberg: So how come you stayed on for a doc-
torate?
Raiffa: Along with the courses I took in statistics,
I also took for cultural curiosity a course in the foun-
dations of mathematics by a Professor Copeland
who later became one of my mentors. Copeland taught
the course using the R. L. Moore pedagogical style.
Are you familiar with this approach, Steve?
Fienberg: Yes, I am. But please tell us a little
about the R. L. Moore pedagogy anyway. I under-
stand that Jimmy Savage also became enamored
with studying mathematics after being exposed to
the Moore approach.
Raiffa: I never knew this until I attended a memo-
rial service for Jimmy. Well, I was similarly affected.
I was studying for a master’s degree in statistics;
going for a doctorate was not an alternative in my
personal decision space—it just wasn’t, but it should
have been if I had only known more about making
smart choices.
Copeland’s first assignment was weird: “Here are
some seemingly unrelated mathematical curiosities.
Think about them. Try to make some conjectures
about them. Try to prove your conjectures. Try to
discover something of interest to talk about.” I drew
a blank and I came to class with nothing to con-
tribute. So did twenty other students.
At the beginning of class on that first day the
instructor asked, “Does anybody have any contri-
butions to make?” We sat and sat and sat and ten
minutes went by and he said, “Class dismissed.” He
added, “The same assignment tomorrow.” The fol-
lowing day, he started the class: “Anybody have any-
thing to say?” Finally, someone raised their hand
and asked a question. The course was pure R. L.
Moore. No books were used, absolutely no books.
It was taboo to look at the literature because you
might find hints. You should act as if you were a
mathematician in the 17th century trying to prove
something new. No matter that we were “discover-
ing” well-known results; it was new to us. We stu-
dents did not study mathematics; we did mathemat-
ics. The R. L. Moore method of teaching turned me
on. I knew then that I wanted to become a math-
ematician because it was so much fun and, to my
surprise, I found out that I was pretty good at it.
So I became a student of pure mathematics and
I was deliriously happy. Thanks to my wife, who
by that time became an elementary school teacher
and could support me in a manner that I grew ac-
customed to, we went from abject poverty to solid
riches.
In the year I studied statistics, I don’t think I heard
the word Bayes. As a way of inference it was nonexis-
tent; inference was all strictly done from the Neyman–
Pearson perspective. And the version of Neyman–
Pearson statistics I was exposed to wasn’t very the-
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oretical as well. They talked about tests of signifi-
cance but they really didn’t talk about the power of
the tests.
Eddy: Who were your professors?
Raiffa: Paul Dwyer and Cecil C. Craig.
Fienberg: And they were all stalwarts of the In-
stitute of Mathematical Statistics in its first couple
of decades. So you weren’t turned on by the kind of
statistics they did?
Raiffa: They were good mathematicians and good
statisticians; but to them, statistics meant some-
thing quite restrictive. Dwyer was computational
and Craig did multivariate sampling theory. They
were very good at what they did, but there was not
a decision bone in their bodies.
Fienberg: So you are now studying pure mathe-
matics. How did your interest in game theory start?
Raiffa: For ten hours a week I worked as a research
assistant on an Office of Naval Research (ONR)-
sponsored research program administered jointly by
the Mathematics Department and the School of En-
gineering. My role was to attend national meetings
and listen to applied problems that people were talk-
ing about that related to our ONR project and to try
to formulate interesting mathematical problems for
my more mathematical-oriented colleagues to work
on. I became quite adept at taking ill-formed situa-
tions and translating them into mathematical prob-
lems that other people could work on, including my-
self.
Because submarine warfare was a hot topic, I read
von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s book on Game
Theory—or at least parts of it. Jerry Thompson,
a fellow student, and I developed a paper on how
to solve two-person zero-sum games and we found
out to our delight that this same algorithm could
solve linear programming problems. At that time we
didn’t know anything about the simplex method, so
for maybe two weeks we had the best algorithm for
solving linear programming problems. Incidentally,
Jerry has spent his distinguished academic career
here at Carnegie Mellon University.
At that time there was no well-developed theory
of the simplest two-person, non-zero-sum games—
there still isn’t. I (and probably hundreds of others
unknown to me) investigated the many qualitatively
different bi-matrix games having two strategies for
each player. I, naturally, became intrigued with a
game now known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
I know you are familiar with this game. The point is
that each player has a dominant strategy so the op-
timal thing for each to do is to choose this strategy.
But the rub is that if each player plays wisely, they
each get miserable payoffs. The paradox is that two
wise players do worse than two dumb players. Still,
in a single-shot situation, each player should choose
wisely. Rational individual choice leads to group in-
efficiencies. The anomaly lies in the structure of the
game.
When the game is repeated for a pre-specified
number of iterations, equilibrium analysis specifies
that each player should use his or her dominating
strategy at each trial with the result that each does
miserably trial after trial. The game presents a so-
cial pathology. If the players had pre-play commu-
nication and could make binding agreements, they
would agree to cooperate at each trial by taking
the myopically dominated strategy. In the finitely
repeated game, double crossing at each trial (i.e.,
choosing the non-cooperative strategy at each trial)
is the best retort if the other guy acts that way. But
double crossing at each trial is not the best retort
against someone who is not playing the double cross
strategy at every trial. In the laboratory, most ana-
lytically inclined subjects start by cooperating but
switch to a belligerent stance toward the end of the
number of trials. But there is uncertainty where the
switch will take place.
In Part A of a report I wrote in 1950 on the
two-person non-zero-sum game for the ONR project,
I considered the two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game
repeated a fixed number of times (say 20). I as-
signed a subjective probability distribution over the
way I thought others would play in order to figure
out the best way I should play. In my naivete, with-
out any theory or anything like that, I did what
I now recognize as a prescriptive analysis for one
party, making use of a descriptive modeling pro-
cess for the possible decisions of the other parties.
The descriptive modeling process involved assessing
judgmental probability distributions. I slipped into
being a subjectivist without realizing how radical
I was behaving. That was the natural thing to do.
No big deal.
Part B of the report dealt with complex non-zero-
sum games where there’s no solution. What would
I do if two buddies of mine came over to me and said,
“Look, Howard, we can’t solve this game; there’s no
solution. You resolve it for us. What’s fair?” Essen-
tially I sought an arbitration rule that would pro-
pose a compromise solution for any non-zero-sum
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game. At that time I was familiar with the sem-
inal work of Kenneth Arrow. Arrow sought a so-
cial welfare function that would combine individual
preferences to arrive at a social or group preference.
He examined a set of very plausible constraints on
this social welfare function only to prove that these
requirements were incompatible. No social welfare
function exists that satisfies properties X, Y and Z.
I adopted the Arrow approach: in my state of confu-
sion, I proposed a set of reasonable desiderata for an
arbitration scheme to satisfy and then I investigated
their joint implications.
I remember distinctly how I started my research
on arbitration rules. I attended a lecture by a labor
arbitrator by the name of William Haber. During
his talk about arbitration, I experienced an “aha”
inspiration; I jumped out of my chair while the lec-
ture was going on, I went back to my study and
wrote vigorously for hours without a break on how
I would arbitrate non-zero-sum games. That consti-
tuted Part B of my ONR report on non-zero-sum
games. I used the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem
to show the existence of equilibria strategies.
That report was published informally in the Engi-
neering Department. It was not peer reviewed; it was
simply an informal report. At the time I was prepar-
ing to take my oral qualifying exam and searching
for a thesis topic in linear, normed spaces, Banach
spaces. This was in April of 1950. For the oral quali-
fying exams in the Math Department, the candidate
first had to write a report on what he or she would
like to be examined on; then, depending upon the
report, the examiners structured the oral exam—its
breadth and depth. In my written proposal I ex-
amined how all sorts of mathematical ideas found
their way into the theory of stochastic processes.
And then a surprising thing happened.
My wife, Estelle, received a telephone call from the
very famous algebraist, Richard Brauer, who was
the chairman of my oral examining committee. He
informed her that, on the basis of my written re-
port, the committee decided to excuse me from my
oral exam. And then he said, “By the way, the com-
mittee would like to talk to me about my thesis.”
I came in the next day all excited about the fact
that I didn’t need to take my oral exam and was
told that the committee thought it appropriate that
I use my recently completed Engineering Report as
my doctoral dissertation. I was stunned. So I ended
up not having to take an oral exam, not having to
write a thesis, and I was through before I thought
I started.
Fienberg: So that was the end of your graduate
education! Did you start immediately looking for a
job?
Raiffa: That was in April; it was too late to go on
to the job market and I didn’t know what to do. The
Departments of Mathematics and Psychology initi-
ated an interdisciplinary seminar on Mathematics
in the Social Sciences and as a post-doc I was hired
to be the rapporteur of the seminar. I was charged
to record what was said during the meetings and
“what should have been said.” I had a ball! For that
one year I steeped myself mostly in psychological
measurement theory, working with Clyde Coombs
from psychology and Larry Klein from economics.
That involvement constituted an important part of
my analytical roots.
During my post-doc year I also gave a series of
seminar talks to the statistical faculty and doctoral
students on Abraham Wald’s newly published book
on Statistical Decision Theory. I was invited to do so
because the book was very mathematical and made
extensive use of game theory in existence proofs.
Wald’s book was full of Bayesian decision rules. Not
as a way of making decisions but as a way of elimi-
nating noncontenders—inadmissible rules. Wald never
used subjective probabilities or judgments to choose
a decision rule. Bayesian analysis was just a math-
ematical technique for finding out complete classes
of admissible decision rules.
The following year I was ready to go on the job
market and I had several offers from mathemat-
ics departments, but there were also two statistics
ones: one from Columbia University’s Department of
Mathematical Statistics, the other one was working
with George Shannon at Bell Labs. The Bell Labs
job paid a lot more than Columbia. But Columbia
presented a unique opportunity for me. A year ear-
lier, Abraham Wald, who was the star of the statis-
tics department at Columbia, was killed in an air-
plane accident over India and his colleagues Jack
Wolfowitz and Jack Keifer left for Cornell whenWald
died. The department was decimated but still there
remained Ted Anderson, Henry Scheffe, Howard Lev-
ene and Herbert Solomon. But they needed someone
desperately to teach Wald’s stuff and to supervise
his many doctoral students. I was supposed to fill
that bill because I knew Wald’s book.
I really was not prepared. Wald’s doctoral stu-
dents knew more statistics than I and there were
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Fig. 2. Raiffa with his wife Estelle and Carnegie Mellon President Jared L. Cohon at Dickson Prize Ceremony in April,
2000.
times when I hadn’t the faintest idea what they
were talking about. I had to learn and give lec-
tures on advanced topics in statistics. I did what
I called “just-in-time” teaching. I used a book by
Blackwell and Girshick. At that time it was avail-
able only in a pre-printed form and it hadn’t yet
been published. But it was a wonderful book. Black-
well and Girshick were more inclined toward the
Bayesian viewpoint than Wald, but not really. (At
least not then, although Blackwell later became an
ardent supporter of the Bayesian perspective.) The
book carefully skirted issues of measurability by con-
fining itself to the denumerable case; it did nothing
continuous. I bracketed their presentation by exam-
ining more closely the finite case, spending a lot of
time on n= 2, and then going abstract by consider-
ing the most advanced measure-theoretic version of
the ideas. I produced copious notes for the course.
I was a nervous wreck because my statistical col-
leagues all audited that course. I also taught the
first course in statistics. I taught Neyman–Pearson
theory, tests of hypotheses, confidence intervals, un-
biased estimation and preached about the dangers
of optional stopping that I no longer believe to be
true.
Gradually I became disillusioned. I just didn’t be-
lieve that the basic concepts I was teaching were cen-
tral to what the field should be about. So I repeated
what I knew how to do best. I went back to the Ar-
row approach and in an axiomatic style examined
what primitive things that I believed in and explored
their joint implications. At that time I should have
known about some of the work of Jimmy Savage, but
I didn’t; I didn’t even know who Jimmy Savage was.
But in 1954 I came across a paper by Herman Cher-
noff justifying the Laplace solution to these prob-
lems. Essentially in a state of ignorance it argued
for using a uniform prior distribution over states.
I had my reservations about the full analysis, but
Chernoff used an axiom he attributed to Herman
Rubin, called the Sure Thing Principle. I embraced
it wholeheartedly. The implications were devastat-
ing. It argued for making inferences and decisions
based on the likelihood function. It also ruled out
the Neyman–Pearson theory that preached that you
can’t infer what you should do based on an observed
sample outcome until you think what you would do
for all potential sample outcomes that could have oc-
curred but didn’t. “Nonsense,” says the sure thing
principle. Out went tests and unbiased estimates
and confidence intervals and lots of stuff on optional
stopping. Not much left. Now that we had destroyed
so much, it was time to really seek an alternative to
NP theory.
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Consider the standard problem involving an un-
known population proportion p. That’s the usual
binomial model. The sample produces nine F ’s and
one S in that order and the likelihood function is
(1−p)9p1. Now compare that with the stopping rule
that samples until the first success appears; and sup-
pose that the first S occurs on the tenth trial. The
likelihood function would be the same whether you
had the first stopping rule or the second stopping
rule, and therefore the inference should be the same.
But using Neyman–Pearson tests of hypothesis, the
answers are different—you have to worry about not
only what happened, but what could have happened
according to the sampling plan.
I pushed the axiomatics and convinced myself that
it made sense to assign a prior probability distri-
bution over the states of the problem and maxi-
mize expected utility. It was for me akin to a reli-
gious conversion—from being a Neyman–Pearsonian
to being a Bayesian. I became a closet Bayesian.
I didn’t come out of the closet because my asso-
ciates, whom I admired, were vociferously opposed
to Bayesianism. They thought it was a step back-
ward. They’d say, “Look, Howard, what are you try-
ing to do? Are you trying to introduce squishy judg-
mental, psychological stuff into something which we
think is science?” Jimmy Savage, I think, had the
best retort to this. He said: “Yes, I would rather
build an edifice on the shifting sands of subjective
probabilities than building on a void.”
The biggest difference between me and my col-
leagues at Columbia was the kind of problems that
we worked on. They were basically driven by the
problem of inference. They paid lip service to de-
cision problems by considering whether one should
reject a null hypothesis, but really basically what
they were interested in was problems of statistical
sampling and inference going from observations to
parameters. I came from a background in game the-
ory and operational research, so for me a proto-
typical problem was: how much should you stock
of a product when demand was unknown. For me,
that unknown demand was the population value and
that population value had a probability distribution.
The whole point of doing sampling was to get bet-
ter information, to get more informed probability
distributions. Decisions were tied to real economic
problems, not phony ones like should you accept a
null hypothesis. That was really the divide, because
my Columbia colleagues, whom I greatly admired,
Henry Scheffe´, Ted Anderson, Herb Robbins and
others weren’t interested in my class of problems.
To me they were primarily inference people.
Fienberg: I notice from your resume that in 1957
you published the highly acclaimed book on Games
and Decisions with Duncan Luce (Luce and Raiffa,
1957). You must have written this during the same
period of time you were primarily learning and teach-
ing and establishing your philosophical roots in statis-
tics. Could you tell us about your game theory ac-
tivities during this period?
Raiffa: A group of us started the interdisciplinary
Behavioral Models Project at Columbia and we hired
a mathematical psychologist, Duncan Luce, to su-
pervise the project. Duncan was not affiliated with
any department at the time. The principals were
Paul Lazersfeld from psychology, Ernest Nagel from
philosophy, Bill Vickery from economics, and I sup-
pose I should include myself from statistics. As the
junior member of that steering committee, I acted as
Chairman of the project and Duncan and I carried
the burden of pushing the project along. We had ex-
ternal financial support and ran seminars and hired
pre-docs. We proposed publishing a series of short
50-page monographs on the topics that featured the
use of mathematics in the social sciences—topics
such as learning theory, psychological measurement
theory, game theory, informatics and cybernetics—
but we couldn’t get any authors to submit manu-
scripts. So Duncan and I decided to write a 50-page
document on games and decisions, on game theory
really. We eventually gave up writing that fifty-page
document and wrote instead a 500-page book on
games and decisions. It took us two years to write.
In 1953–1954, Duncan was at the Center for Ad-
vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford
and I was at Columbia. The following year I went
to that institute and he was back at Columbia. We
were together face to face for five days in these two
years, in an era well before e-mail, and we wrote
the Games and Decisions book. It included a lot of
material from my unpublished “non-dissertation.”
Fienberg: That was a landmark book in many
senses and it’s still in print as a Dover paperback
almost a half a century later. What happened next
in your career?
Raiffa: The book still sells a few thousand copies
a year. O.K., it is now ’57 and out of the blue I got
two offers: one from the University of California,
Berkeley—not in statistics—and one from Harvard
University—a joint appointment with the newly cre-
ated Statistics Department and the Business School.
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The newly formed Statistics Department was led by
Fred Mosteller, a wonderful man and statistician,
and it also included Bill Cochran, another great
statistician. So I was very, very flattered, except
I was worried. How would they receive my new con-
version to Bayesianism? I talked to Fred Mosteller
about that and he was lukewarm, but he was tol-
erant. And Cochran said: “Well, you’ll grow up.”
At that time I literally was at Columbia for five
years and I never knew that Columbia had a busi-
ness school all this time. I really didn’t know any-
thing about business and the only reason I decided
to go to Harvard was because of the Statistics De-
partment. They were willing to double my Columbia
salary. Columbia, belatedly, agreed to match it, and
promote me, but we decided to go to Harvard. It
was a close call in making that decision.
My wife, Estelle, and I stewed about the Harvard
offer because there were many conflicting objectives
we had to balance. We did a sort of formal anal-
ysis of this decision problem. Our analysis involved
ten objectives that we scored and weighted. My wife
is not mathematically inclined at all, but for this
case she joined me in making all the assessments. It
turned out that we agreed on practically everything.
Harvard was the clear winner. Of course, there were
some dimensions where Columbia was better, so it
wasn’t a dominating solution, but the formalization
helped us really decide that it wasn’t a close call at
all. We then followed some advice that was given to
us by Patty Lazersfeld. She advised that in decisions
of this kind, don’t ever make your choice without
testing it. You tell your friends that you’re going
to Harvard, you tell your family, but you don’t tell
the administration. Then before you officially com-
mit yourself, you see how you sleep for a week. And
that’s what we did. We slept well, we felt content,
and we ended up at Harvard.
Fienberg: But when I arrived at Harvard in 1964
you were in essence full-time at the business school.
How did this shift occur?
Raiffa: Surprisingly to me, my academic life didn’t
revolve around the statistics department; it revolved
around a place called the Business School. At the
B-School I worked closely with Robert O. Schlaifer.
He’s probably the person who influenced me more
in my life than anybody else. He was trained as a
classical historian and classical Greek scholar. Dur-
ing the war he worked for the underwater laboratory
writing prose for technical reports. He ended up at
the end of the war writing a tome on the engineering
and economics of aviation engines. By some involve-
ment, by some fluke, he received an appointment at
the Business School but he had no specialty. The
single professor at the B-School who taught a prim-
itive course in statistics retired at that time and
Robert was asked to teach that course. Thus his-
tory was made. Trained as a classical historian, he
knew nothing about statistics, so he read the “clas-
sics”: R. A. Fisher, Neyman and Pearson—not Wald
and not Savage—and he concluded that standard
statistical pedagogy did not address the main prob-
lem of a businessman: how to make decisions un-
der uncertainty. Not knowing anything about the
subjective/objective philosophical divide, he threw
away the books and invented Bayesian decision the-
ory from scratch. Since he had little mathematics,
most of his examples involved discrete problems or
the univariate case, like an unknown population pro-
portion.
Robert had had only one course in mathematics,
in the calculus. But he had raw mathematical abil-
ities, provided he could see how it might be put to
use. He was single-minded in his pursuit of relevance
to the real world. When I came there, he was thrilled
that here was a kindred soul that could tutor him in
just the kind of mathematics he needed. I spent most
of my days teaching Robert Schlaifer mathematics—
first calculus, then linear algebra. I would teach him
something about linear algebra in the morning and
he would show me how it could be applied in the af-
ternoon. He was not only smarter than other people,
but he worked longer hours than anyone else.
Fienberg: I’ve heard you being alluded to as Mr.
Decision Tree. What’s the story behind that?
Raiffa: Already in my book with Luce on game
theory, published in 1957, I used game trees to define
games in extensive form. There were player nodes
and chance nodes, but all chance nodes had associ-
ated, objective probabilities in the common knowl-
edge domain. When I started working on individual
decision problems at the B-School I modified the
game tree into a decision tree that featured chance
nodes with probability distributions subjectively as-
sessed by the decision maker. My nonmathemati-
cally inclined audiences found it impossible to follow
the logic of the analysis without an accompanying
decision tree to keep track of the discussion. My use
of decision trees started as a search for pedagogi-
cal simplicity, but I gradually became dependent on
them myself. It’s interesting to reflect why I never
used decision trees earlier in teaching elementary
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Fig. 3. Harvard Statistics Department, 1957. From left to right: John Pratt, Raiffa, William Cochran, Arthur Dempster and
Frederick Mosteller.
statistics at Columbia. In Applied Statistical Deci-
sion Theory (ASDT), I present a schematic decision
tree depicting the prototypical or canonical statisti-
cal decision problem. [At this point Raiffa went to
the blackboard.]
At move 1, a decision node, the decision maker
(DM) has a choice of experiments or information-
gathering alternatives including the null experiment,
which means acting now without gathering further
information about the unknown population parame-
ter, θ. Move 2 is in chance’s domain and the sample
outcome is symbolically denoted by z. At move 3
the DM must choose a terminal act a and at move
4 chance reveals the true population parameter θ.
This requires specifying the marginal probability of
z at move 2 and at move 4 the conditional or pos-
terior probability of θ given z. To make these prob-
ability assessments, the DM usually starts with a
subjectively assessed prior distribution of θ and an
objective, model-based conditional sampling distri-
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Fig. 4. Raiffa drawing the decision tree.
bution of z given each value of θ. The DM then uses
Bayes’ theorem to find the probabilities required at
move 4 and at 1. This is so standard that analysts
using this methodology are called Bayesians. Classi-
cists mistakenly choose not to assign probabilities at
moves 2 and 4 because these involve subjective prob-
ability inputs and are taboo. Hence, for them, there
is no gain to be had from considering this schematic
decision tree.
Fienberg: In 1957, when you really launched your
efforts into the Bayesian direction, the word Bayesian
was not used except perhaps in a pejorative or math-
ematical formalism kind of way. Jimmy Savage, Jack
Good and Dennis Lindley did not call themselves
Bayesians in the early parts of the fifties. Yet by the
time you wrote the book with Bob, it had become
second nature to identify yourself as such. How did
that happen? How did Bayesian inference become
known as “Bayesian”?
Raiffa: In the preface to ASDT we refer to “the
so-called Bayesian approach.” I’m not sure who is
responsible for the nomenclature. But I dislike us-
ing the term “Bayesian” to refer to decision ana-
lysts who believe in using subjective probabilities
because, once we generalize from the standard classi-
cal statistical paradigm, the schematic decision tree
in the shown figure is too special and not indicative
of the broader class of decision problems; and, in
this wider class, subjective probability assignments
are often made without invoking Bayes’s formula.
Fienberg: So how would you like to be called?
Raiffa: I think of myself as a decision analyst who
believes in using subjective probabilities. I would
prefer being called a “subjectivist” than a “Bayesian.”
Robert and I divided Bayesians into two groups: en-
gineers and scientists, or “echt” and the “nonecht.”
The really true subjectivists were the engineers. The
nonecht scientists never elicited judgmental ques-
tions from anybody. For them it’s all abstract. The
echt folk got their hands dirty. In the early 1960s
we had a series of distinguished Bayesians (Lind-
ley, Box and Tiao), who each spent a semester at
the Business School. They were primarily wonderful
statisticians of the non-echt variety. The most no-
table of our echt visitors was Amos Tversky—but
he visited us in the early 1980s. Next to Schlaifer,
Amos was the person who influenced me most. But
Amos was not a statistician.
Fienberg: Howard, why don’t you continue with
the story of your early interactions with Schlaifer.
Raiffa: Robert and I taught an elective course to-
gether in statistics at the B-School and it was a ball.
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I opted for teaching both the objectivist and sub-
jectivist points of view side by side with an openly
declared preference for the subjective school. Robert
thought that was a cop-out. He said, “Look, we’re
professors. We are supposed to know what’s right.
You teach what’s right; you don’t teach what’s
wrong.” “But our students are going to have to read
the literature,” I retorted. “Since when do business-
men—never women—read the literature?” He
wouldn’t have anything to do with teaching Neyman–
Pearson theory; it was judgmental probability all the
way right down the line. The closest I could push
him toward the classical school was to examine de-
cision problems from the normal—as contrasted to
the extensive—form of analysis. Not only was he
smart, very smart, but he was the most opinionated
person I ever met.
One objection we encountered in using the subjec-
tivist approach to statistics was that it was too hard.
Robert and I explored ways to simplify it. In 1959,
after I was at the B-School two years, we started
writing a book together on what you have alluded
to as Bayesian statistics. It was not so much a book
to be read or even a textbook but a compendium
of results for the specialist. The theme of our book
was: it doesn’t have to be too complicated; anything
the classicists can do we can do also—only better.
We discovered a simple algebraic way to go from
priors to posteriors for sampling distributions that
admitted fixed-dimensional sufficient statistics, like
the exponential distributions.
Kadane: You mean the use of conjugate priors.
Fienberg: Well, you certainly succeeded in push-
ing the ideas. I’m opening the book right now, and
here, almost at the beginning, there is a classical re-
sult on minimal sufficient statistics and exponential
families. And then suddenly, as if out of nowhere,
you introduce conjugate families and conjugate pri-
ors. Clearly, the ideas were around for special cases,
going back at least into the nineteenth century, but
I haven’t found any other source that laid the ap-
proach out in full generality. How did you come to
this idea?
Raiffa: Well, it was pretty obvious that if we’re
going to get a systematic Bayesian approach for
the exponential-family distributions, we needed to
get something where updating could be done alge-
braically in a formal sort of way. We needed the
prior and posterior to belong to the same family of
distributions and to conform well to the likelihood
function. It’s not hard to see how the mathematics
would go. So I guess I can take credit for that.
Fienberg: You should!
Raiffa: I’ll take responsibility for that one. It just
seemed all so natural.
Our effort turned into the book you mentioned at
the beginning, Applied Statistical Decision Theory,
which I’m proud to say has been republished by Wi-
ley in their classics series. Originally the book was
published not by a regular publishing house but by
the Harvard Business School Division of Research,
which had never published anything mathematical
before. The book must have sold maybe three hun-
dred copies.
Jimmy Savage reviewed the manuscript very fa-
vorably and he called the notation dazzlingly in-
tricate. He didn’t like the notational conventions.
I take responsibility for the intricate hieroglyphics.
It works for me and seems to work also for novices
who have not been brainwashed with usages of other
notations. The theory is intricate enough so that
when I’m away from the field for long periods of time
and then return, I have a tough time remembering
the theory and the notation comes to my rescue. Let
me illustrate what I’m talking about. Let me go to
the blackboard and show you. We consider a pop-
ulation parameter, designated by the Greek symbol
µ; since µ is an uncertain quantity, we flag it with
a tilde sign, µ˜. We distinguish between prior distri-
butions and posterior distributions of µ˜ by primes
and double primes, giving respectively µ˜′ and µ˜′′.
We distinguish the prior mean—that is, the mean
of µ˜′—which we label µ¯′—from the posterior mean
µ¯′′. Now we get more complicated. From a prior
point of view, we might be interested in the as-yet-
unknown posterior mean. The distribution of this
quantity was dubbed by Robert, the pre-posterior
distribution and renamed by our students as the pre-
posterous distribution. The prior variance of the as-
yet-unknown posterior mean is connoted by v′. The
posterior distribution of µ˜ depends upon a sufficient
statistic z, which we bring into our notational fold,
and so it goes.
Fienberg: While that first printing of ASDT by
the Business School may have not sold very many
copies, a later paperback version brought out by
MIT Press was widely used and important to those
of us who tried to take the conjugate prior frame-
work into statistical problems beyond decision the-
ory. But then fairly soon after the book first ap-
peared, you began to turn to related problems. How
did this happen?
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Fig. 5. Raiffa recreating the ASDT notation at the blackboard.
Raiffa: ASDT was written in 1959 and 1960 and
published in ’61. Schlaifer and I would discuss some
ideas and my style was to start writing when I was
still confused. The task of writing focused my mind.
Schlaifer had trouble writing first drafts. He would
look at what I had written and invariably his reac-
tion was: “This is terrible,” and he would tear up
my version and write something better. But he had
trouble starting without something to criticize.
In the academic year 1960–1961, I was awfully
busy since I organized, at the request of the Ford
Foundation, a special 11-month program for 40
research-oriented professors, teaching in management
schools, who felt the need to learn more mathemat-
ics. That program, The Institute for Basic Math-
ematics for Application to Business (IBMAB), was
reputed to be a huge success and the next generation
of deans at such prestigious business schools as Har-
vard, Stanford and Northwestern were all graduates
of that program. Naturally, in the IBMAB program
I taught statistics from a subjectivist perspective
with a heavy decision orientation and the gospel ra-
diated outward in schools of management.
In the academic year 1961–1962, another radical
thing happened to me. I was a second reader of a
thesis proposal by Jack Grayson, a student in the
Business School, in the area of finance. Grayson was
interested in financial decisions of oil wildcatters.
Through his interaction with me, his thesis was ex-
panded from a purely descriptive to a prescriptive
perspective. How should wildcatters accumulate in-
formation from geologic surveys, seismic soundings,
exploratory wells, expert judgments? The drilling of
an exploratory well was simultaneously a terminal-
action and an information-gathering move. How
should they form syndicates for the sharing of risks?
This leads to decision problems galore, and the prob-
lems did not easily conform to the classical statisti-
cal decision paradigm involving sampling to gather
information about an unknown population param-
eter. The statistical decision paradigm seemed too
restrictive, too hobbling, too narrow. Schlaifer con-
curred with me and we began to think of ourselves
more as decision analysts than as statisticians. I don’t
know why it took so long to make the shift, but in
my mind every problem that I thought of up until
that point was cast in the old statistical paradigm
of going from a prior to a posterior distribution
of a population parameter. With my new orienta-
tion I saw problems all over the place in business,
in medicine, in engineering, in public policy where
the decision problems under uncertainty did not fit
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comfortably into the classical mold. We were excited
about our new vision of the world of uncertainty
with a vast new agenda and we started the Decision
under Uncertainty Seminar that you, Steve, referred
to earlier.
Fienberg: This was also around the time that John
Pratt worked with you and Robert on the introduc-
tory book that appeared in its preliminary edition
in 1965. It was called Introduction to Statistical De-
cision Theory—ISDT in contrast to ASDT*. I stud-
ied from that unpublished manuscript. But then you
never quite polished it up and finished it. What hap-
pened?
Raiffa: The reason why we didn’t publish this mas-
sive 900-page book after we essentially finished it
was that Schlaifer and I no longer believed in the
centrality of the standard statistical paradigm as de-
picted in the above figure. The book was put aside
because we had a new exciting agenda to explore.
But we should have finished it. The fact that the
book was available in a pre-publication form also
took off the pressure for actually publishing it. That
book wasn’t finished until 1995, when I retired and
had more time and more maturity. Pratt did most
of the polishing and added more theoretical mate-
rial, but Schlaifer chose not to get involved in the
revisions.
We are now back in 1963 and with ISDT on a back
burner, we eagerly pursued our new agenda. We
had to learn how to elicit judgments from people—
probabilities and utilities. Skeptics asserted that we
couldn’t get real experts to provide these subjec-
tive assessments. Well, we demonstrated to our sat-
isfaction that was not the case. We worked with
engineers and market experts who were more than
willing to give us their subjective probability assess-
ments for real problems. But were these assessments
any good? Garbage in and garbage out. We realized
that if we wanted to elicit judgments in a credible
manner, there was the delicate issue on how you
asked the questions. Framing was crucial. For ex-
ample, we learned that if we asked questions about
utility judgments in terms of incremental amounts,
we would get different answers than if we asked peo-
ple questions about their asset positions. And then
we had to decide which set of responses should be
used. Schlaifer and I convinced ourselves that ques-
tions should be posed in terms of asset positions and
not in terms of incremental amounts of money, be-
cause increments invited all kinds of zero illusions.
I had a doctoral student who investigated the prob-
lem of overconfidence under my supervision. Experts
did not calibrate very well; they were surprised a
surprising number of times and we had to make our
experts aware of this tendency. Our motivation was
not description, but prescription, but nevertheless
our students and we did a lot of work in what is
now called behavioral decision making.
In the mid-1960s Robert introduced a required
course in the first year of the MBA entitled Man-
agerial Economics. All 800 students were exposed
to cases that featured decision making under un-
certainty. It was an heroic effort that was not uni-
versally appreciated by some of our nonnumerate
students. But it was like an existence theorem: it
demonstrated that decision analysis was relevant and
teachable to future managers. In retrospect I think
the effort was done too quickly without enough at-
tention to palatable pedagogy. At semester’s end the
students burned one of Robert’s books, one that
I believe deserved a prize for innovation.
In the mid-1960s, I was offered and accepted a
joint chair between the Business School and the Eco-
nomics Department. I relished the fact that I never
took a course in economics. I taught decision anal-
ysis, which in my mind had a different agenda than
courses I once taught in statistical decision theory.
I drifted away from Robert as I started to work on
problems more in the public sector and to do re-
search on multiple conflicting objectives and nego-
tiations. But that research, together with my expe-
riences at IIASA, are other chapters in my career
which I’ll discuss tomorrow at the Dickson Award
ceremonies.
Fienberg: As you look back over the field of statis-
tics, don’t you have a sense of satisfaction about how
your work with Robert and John has influenced oth-
ers and the growth of the Bayesian school?
Raiffa: Certainly I’m proud of what I’ve contributed
in this field. But still I’m a little disappointed. If we
made a survey of the way statistics is taught across
the country, it would be dominated by the old stuff,
the Neyman–Pearson theory. Carnegie Mellon is a
maverick; is an exception. The subjectivist school of
decision making is not being taught in many places.
Kass: I think it’s turned a corner.
Raiffa: Here, at Carnegie Mellon for sure, but. . .
Kass: Well, no, I think in the world, in the last
ten years or so I think it’s really started to change.
And I don’t think it’s only in statistics but in lots of
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other fields, applied areas that really use statistical
ideas and methods.
Raiffa: Well, let’s look at the curricula of most
of the universities. I think that overwhelmingly the
classical school is still dominant at most universities.
I was instrumental in helping to start the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard and in the begin-
ning I had some input in what was taught. In the
early days the curriculum was decision and policy
oriented and Bayesian statistics and decision anal-
ysis were taught and integrated in the curriculum.
But new teachers were hired and they taught what
they had learned as students and Bayesianism dis-
appeared.
Kass: I have another question; it’s almost the same
as Steve’s, involving the Bayes part of it. One of the
things that’s so interesting to many of us is to ex-
amine the way one body of work influences another.
And in the case of your book with Schlaifer, it’s
easy to see how that influenced, for instance, Mor-
rie DeGroot’s book, which came a decade or so later,
and then, much later, Jim Berger’s book which most
students today are familiar with in modern statisti-
cal decision theory. In retrospect it’s clear how your
book inspired the material and presentation in DeG-
root’s book. To see these three books, one right after
another, it’s very easy to trace the influences back-
wards, but how do we trace things back to see the
influences on your work with Robert as a Bayesian?
Raiffa: Schlaifer was driven by the need to coor-
dinate statistics with business decision making and
he truly discovered from scratch the basic ideas of
what you refer as Bayesianism. I, on the other hand,
was brainwashed into the classical tradition and had
to go through a religious conversion.
Kadane: What about Jimmy Savage’s work and
his 1954 book?
Raiffa: Somehow I just was not aware of that book
until I left Columbia. I already mentioned Herman
Chernoff’s paper and Herman Rubin’s sure thing
principle. That had a profound effect on me.
Kass: Not only has the Bayesian world become
more intimately involved in applications since your
early efforts, but statistics as a whole has moved in
this direction.
Raiffa: I hope you are correct but it’s painfully
slow. I look forward to the day that there will be
Departments of Decision Sciences in other universi-
ties besides Carnegie-Mellon and Duke. Statistics is
a broad subject encompassing data analysis, mod-
eling and inference as well as decisions. I just don’t
want the decision component to disappear.
Fienberg: Well, Howard, we all look forward to a
continuation of this conversation when you can tell
us more about your analytical roots as a decision
scientist and about your experiences after 1967.
Raiffa: I look forward to it.
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